Chilpter 118/Population Policy in Russia rehabilitating people in good health; (6) to become involved in activities designed to give people a better understanding of the value of good health and encour age them to adopt behaviors to help safeguard it; (7) to develop medical sciences and advanced medical technologies, in every way possible, including infor mation technologies; (8) to meet the population's need for medications and other medical products; (9) to set up a system of sociomedical insurance; (10) to fix a price policy in the market for medical services; (11) to introduce professional liability insurance, and improve the social protection for health sector person nel; (12) to create a system of medical rehClbilitation, and develop preventoriums and sanatoriums; (13) to extend the organizational and legal framework of public,health institutions, and optimize the nomencla ture of medical specialties.
On the whole, this document reads more like an ideological text, in the maru1er of numerous writings of the Soviet period, than a practical guide for action. It reflects the ideas and interests of the Ministry of Health's main leaders before its reorganization in 2004; with little danger of being proved wrong, it can be said that this document will go through major adjustments in the coming years.
It is not surprising that the transition period's blurred policy did not lead to any major success. Apart from a reduction in the number of abortions, declines in maternal and child mortality, and gaining control orer a certain number of infectious diseases, such as diphtheria, whooping cough, hepatitiS A, typhoid, brucellosis, rabies, or malaria, the popuJCltion's health status has shown no positive change, nor any promis ing tendency. Incredible as this may sound, Russians have a lower life expectancy at birth at the start of the 21st century than they had 40 years ago.
It was easy to identify the key hea th challenges, and certain policies could have met these challenges. Looking first at the rapid worsening of various infectious diseases (tuberculosis, STDs, AIDS); for all these diseases, morbidity rates increased at an unprecedented rate in the last decade. Although the ising incidence has slowed down in the last two or three years, the future evolution of the situation remains uncertain and worrying. Second, exogenous mortality (accidents, accidental poisoning, homicides) hows no sign of letting up. On the contrary, it has begun to rise again, probably as a result of increasing alcohol consumption. Third, the risks of premature death, essentially through cardiovascular and chronic diseases, have grown substantially. In the current state of affairs, it is impossible to foresee how society and the State could curb a trend that started more than 40 years ago.
III. MIGRATION POLICY

Internal Migrations
During the Soviet period, the size and nature of internal migratory flows were essentially determined by two State-driven processes: forced industrializa tion, which accelerated the process of urbanization, and the development of peripheral regions, which trig gered off massive flows toward the east and north of the country. The aim was to transform an agrarian country into an industrial power as quickly as possi ble by trClnsferring resources, human and others, from the countryside to the cities, or toward regions to be developed. The immense population movements engendered by urbanization and regional develop ment were completely consistent with the policy of the State. In so doing, however, the authorities rightly feored losing control over massive migrations that risked ruining the system, a danger they sought to avoid.
Deep regional inequalities in living conditions were present throughout the entire Soviet era. An immense urban-industrial periphery living in poverty existed alongside small enclaves where living standards were relatively high and artificially maintained (capital cities, several regional centers, or privileged industrial centers). Residents of the periphery were constantly on the lookout for the slightest opportunity to move toward more prosperous areas, thereby undermining the very idea of privileged enclaves. The authorities also feared too swift an exodus from the countryside, which played the role of an internal colony whose exploitation had for a long time made it possible for them to achieve their ambitious plans. In a word, massive migrations were necessary for development, but their strict control was just as necessary to anchor and maintain the totalitarian political regime tllen asserting itself. These contradictory aims spawned a hypocritical and paradoxical migrCltory policy. On the one hand, the State did its utmost to bolster the factors forcing people to leave the countryside and small towns, and to ensure an uninterrupted flow of unde manding human resources toward industry and other urban sectors, the army, and remote regions. On the other hand, however, the State implemented a system of restrictions and barriers to ensure its total power over migration by submitting every individual move to bureaucratic controls.
The key instrument of this policy ,,,,as the internal passport system. Making it possible to control all citi zens' movements, this system had been Widely used in Western Europe in the 19th century but had more or less disappeored everyvvhere by the beginning of the Ivanov, Vidmevsky, and Zakharov 20th century. It had been kept in place in Russia (at least for those who left their permanent place of resi dence), however, providing Lenin with the opportu nity of declaring, in 1903:
Social-democrats demand complete freedom of movement and enterpnse for the people. But what does "freedom of movement" mean? [... j It means that passports must also be elinlinated in Russia (in other states, passports have long since disappeared) [...J that no policemen, no zemstvo civil servant will have the power to stop people from living and working wherever they see fit. I...J Isn't this a case of feud,,1 serfdom 7 Isn't it insulting people 7 (Lenin, [1966] ).
Once in power the Bolsheviks eliminated the inter nal passport and, despite the fact that serious obstacles to the movement of citizens resurfaced in the years fol lowing the revolution, the general policy of abolishing "feudal serfdom" remained in force for some time. In 1922-1923, a whole series of legislative documents were adopted to abolish the system of internal pass ports and all institutions related to it, as well as ali other constraints on the right of Russian Federation cit izens to move or reside anywhere on the Russian ter ritory, by demanding that they have a residence permit or other such document. Thus, The Small Soviet Ency clopedia could write that "Soviet law does not recog nize the system of internal passports [which] had been an important tool of police intervention and fiscal policy in a so-called police State" (Encyclopedia, 1930) .
Less than 10 years latel~ however, a new article in The Great Soviet Encyclopedia tells of the Bolshevik State's sudden policy turnaround:
Passport system: rules of administrative registralion, of control and regulations over population movement through the introduction of passports for the said popula non. The Soviet legislation [... J never concealed that its passport system was claSS-based, using it according to the conditions of class struggle a.nd the aims of the working class's dicta torship at different stages in the construction of socialism. (Encyclopedia, 1939) These words referred to the new system of internal passports already established by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on December 27, 1932. Accord ing to this decree, all peopJe living in cities, industrial towns, sovkhozes, and new cities had to have an inter nal passport stamped by the authorities testifying to their place of domicile (the propiska). Ipso facto, this inhibited the right to move since the choice of resi dence depended on the possibility of obtaining the propiska. Very quickly, in cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, the federal republic capitals, and other important cities, the propiskll. was restricted, and even citizens with a passport could obtain the propiska only with speCial authorization. As for the peasants-the majority of the country's population-without pass ports, they were unable to move to the city and were effectively prevented from leaving their village or kolkhoze.
Admittedly, the State did not intend to ban all migrations by introducing such restrictions. On the contrary, its economic policy demanded a radical upheaval in the population's geographical distribution and, as a consequence, vast migration. The aim was to define and control these flows from the center, regard less of its citizens' individual aspirations. As Stalin declared in 1939, "at present it is only a matter of pro posing to the kholkozes to accept our request and allow at least one and a half million young members of kholkozes to depart each year to satisfy industry'S increasing needs" (Stalin, 1952) . Although rather hyp ocritical, Stalin's formulation clearly reveals the cynical order thus created: the individual could only move if "he was allowed to leave" by being granted a passport authorizing him to go and live elsewhere. From this point on, migration flows were thus strictly regulated_ By the late 1930s, the already severe controls placed on population movement proved insufficient. As a result, in 1940, a new law added penal sanctions against any individual leaving his work or ch,mging his place of work without authorization. Conversely, engineers, technicians and qualified workers who refused to accept a change of residence dictated by the State could be penalized. Although this Jaw was at first followed to the letter, it was undoubtedly applied less rigidly over the years; nonetheless, the 1940 Jaw was abrogated only in 1956.
These regulations aimed at controlling spontaneous migrations, or those considered as such, even though the desire to migrate often resulted from very pressing economic or political constraints. In counterpoint, forced migration also existed, involving mass dis placements and even repreSSive population transfers.
The Soviet regime frequently resorted to political repression to solve the most diverse problems, with economic issues first, or almost first, among them. As early as 1929, on the basis of a proposal put forth by a special commission of the Politburo, the Sovnarkom adopted a secret decree on "the use of prisoners' labor," which specified that people condemned to 3 years or more of "deprivation of freedom" by common law tribunals had to serve their sentence in labor camps by working for OGPu. And, to welcome those deprived of their freedom, the OGPU had in turn to enlarge or build new labor camps in remote areas "in order to colonize them and exploit their natural resources by using the labor of those deprived of freedom" (Materik, 2000, p. 64) .
Very quickly, deprivation of freedom for criminal or political offences became an important instrument for the "colonization of outlying regions." These regions soon became the sites of a vast network of camps, colonies, and special settlements (spetsposelenie) where millions of people newly deprived of their freedom were sent: dekoulakised peasants, Gulag prisoners, ethnic deportees, and so on. In 1953, the total number of prisoners and specposelency rose to 5.4 million people, while Siberia, the Far-East and Kazakhstan combined, where most of these prisoners were con centrated, barely numbered 30 million inhabitants in total.
Stalin's death ended these massive deportations, but the system of migration regulation initiated under Stalin did not die with him.
The discrimination imposed by the system of inter nal passports went on for a long time. It took more than 20 years before new passport regulations in the USSR were introduced by a USSR's Council of Minis ters Decree on August 28, 1974; according to this new decree, passports had to be issued to all USSR citizens aged 16 years and over. For the first time, this decree created the same system for rural and urban dwellers. 'The passport campaign began on the first of January 1976 and was completed on 31st December 1981. In 6years, 50 million passports were delivered in rural localities." (Lioubarski Kronid, Regime de passeport et regime de propiska en Russie, http://www.hrights.ru/ text/b2/Chapter5.htm).
The propiska lasted even longer, until the USSR col lapsed, and has still not completely disappeared. In principle, any citizen holding a passport could move freely throughout the entire country; in reality, however, he could not settle in any place where the propiska was restricted as, without it, he had access to neither work nor housing. As the demand for labor was in general very high in these regions, the State's need for labor in key economic sectors (industry, science, etc.) was in constant contradiction with a migration policy that paralyzed the labor market. In practice, the creation of non-viable artificial social sta tuses made it possible to bypass these contradictions. Thus appeared millions of limitchik-people whom businesses and state organizations were entitled to employ by issuing them with a temporary propiska for the duration of their contract of employment. This authorization to live in large cities was precarious and did not extend to other members of the family (even marriage to a limitchik did not entitle them to a provi sional propiska).
Only on October 26,1990, did the USSR's Supreme Soviet Committee for Constitutional Supervision acknowledge that the propiska's authorization proce dure in force for so many years "prevents citizens from enjoying their fundamental right to freedom of move ment, work, and education"; legally, this paved the way for abolishing the propiska. Furthermore, on June 25, 1993, President Boris Yeltsin approved the law on "the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of movement and to the choice of their place of residence within the limits of the Russian Federation," which should have put a term to the propiska. In reality, this did not happen. In many places, the attempt to eradicate the propiska's authori zation procedure met with resistance from local authorities, and it still survives today. Moreover, many bureaucrats at all levels still open!y favor a return to the propiska.
Although prohibitive and repressive measures were the main tool of Soviet migration policy, this was seldom referred to. Instead, the focus was constantly placed on the incentives that had also always existed. A whole system of privileges had been created at the time the State needed to increase flows of migrants toward certain cities or regions. A most typical example is the priority accorded to regions of the extreme North, rich in natural resources but suffering from harsh climatic conditions. The list and particular status of these territories were defined in 1967 by a decree of the Soviet government. In 1990, the list was extended to 70% of Russia's territory (11.9 million sq. km.), without any real reason according to some authors. Those volunteering to come and work in these regions enjoyed a higher salary, more days off, subsidies for temporary work stoppage, higher pen sions, and so on. These measures met with relative success. The benefits attracted many people to the northern regions; in 20 years, from 1970 to 1989, the population in the far eastern regions increased notice ably, from 7.2% to 8.6% of Russia's total population (12.6 million people). In subsequent years, these regions lost some of their economic attraction and their population size, in absolute terms and as the percent age of the country's total population, has started decreasing.
Another type of incentive was used to encourage migrations toward developing regions. It consisted of combining economic interests with young people's enthusiasm referred to as the "komsomol appeals." In the decades following World War II and until the mid 1980s, it was common practice to call on volunteers to work on the large sites of natural resource develop ment, construction of railways, power stations, and so on. In this way was ensured, for instance, a flow of young people to Kazakhstan in the 1950s, to exploit virgin lands or build the Baikal-Amour railroad during the 1970s.
During World War II, people and industries were evacuated from the occupied territories, which played a considerable role in increasing the population and developing the economy of the Asian part of Russia.
The population census of 1989 makes it possible to assess the results of internal migration during the post war period and, as a consequence, the effect of Soviet migration policy
According to the first Soviet census of 1926, 82% of the population within the borders of the USSR as well as those of Russia were rural (Goskomstat, 1988, p. 8) . At the end of the 1920s, right from the start of forced industrialization, a rural exodus took place on an unprecedented scale. Between the 1926 and 1939 cen suses, the urban population of the USSR (within the pre-1939 frontiers) increased by 30 million people (from 26.3 to 56.1 million) and its share of the total pop ulation rose from 18 to 33% (Goskomstat, 1988) . Over the next 50 years, the USSR's total population (within its new borders) increased by 94.5 million but, during the same period, the urban population gre,'" by 127.5 million whereas the rural population fell by 33 million despite its fertility being higher than that of the urban population. Between 1950 and 1990, the USSR's urban population increased, on average, by around 30 million people every 10 years (Goskomstat, 1997, p. 7) . At the end of the 1980s, the urban population repre sented two-thirds of the USSR's total population and close to three-quarters of Russia's population. Of the 29.8 million-strong increase in the urban population of the USSR between 1926 and 1939,18.7 million, or 63%, were migrants from rural areas. Betvveen 1939 and 1969, within the USSR's post-1939 borders, the urban population rose by 75.6 million people, 61 million of whom were migrants (Urlanis, Borisov, 1984, p. 414) .
The migrations taking place during the Soviet period also modified the regional distribution of Russia's population. These changes, however, were less important than those brought about by urbaniza tion. The USSR had inherited from the Russian empire an immense territory far from uniformly populated and developed. During several decades after the end of the 1920s, occurred a substantial shift of population eastwards, as a result of migrations from the European to the Asian parts of Russia. The total population east of the Ural increased from 13 to 22 million people between 1926 and 1939 and reached 32.1 million in 1989 (thus multiplied by a factor of 2.5, whereas Russia's total population increased only 1.7 times). Howevel~ population movements toward the East hardly changed the overall picture (Figure 118-5) . As in the past, Siberia and the Far East have remained very sparsely populated and the concentration of population in the Central region that i.ncludes Moscow, has only slightly decreased (Figure 118-6) .
During the period following the USSR's collapse, former restrictions on freedom of movement were either abolished or considerably weakened, and the State's once active policy in the realm of internal migrations disappeared. Migrations then took place against a backdrop of depopulation, economic crisis, and political conflicts (especially in the Caucasus), and have often flowed in directions contrary to those imposed for decades by previous policies. Noticeable since the late 1980s, this migratory ebb has gathered momentum, mostly from the eastern and northern regions that the State once sought to populate. This is not really because the State, with its more liberal political regime, no longer allows itself to resort to methods used during the Soviet regime. More funda mentally, this occurs because the potential of internal migra tion became severely limited by the level of urban ization already reached and by the trend toward depop ulation. In Russia, internal migration can no longer play the role it enjoyed from 1930 to 1980. Today, the migra tion issues are related much more to external migration, and more precisely to immigration, which completely alters the objectives that policies may be aiming at.
External Migration
a. Emigration
The Russian empire contributed much less than other European countries to the trans-Atlantic migra tions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This can be explained by Siberia's vast and vacant lands, and by the enormous potential for internal agrarian coloniza tion, encouraged by the goverrunent. Nevertheless, the country produced emigration flows, mostly consisting of non-Russians. Estimates put the number of people who emigrated from Russia in the period 1861-1915 at 4.3 million, of whom 2.6 million left during the first fifteen years of the 20th century. Two-thirds went to the United States (close to 80% during this period) (Obolensky-Ossinsky, 1928) . Among those who left, predominated the Jews (approximately 2 million betvveen 1881 and 1914), and other non-Russians. From 1860 until the beguming of World War I, the majority of migrants to North and South America were non-Rus sians: Jews (44%), Poles (25%), Lithuanians (8%), Finns (7%), and Germans (6%) (Obolenski, 1928, p. 24) .
Although World War I abruptly halted these emi gration flows, the Revolution and the civil war gener· ated new, and very different, streClms. In fact, these political upheavals incited a massive and definitive emigration. Although estimates vary greatly from one author to the next, it is now estimated that the USSR, , 2000, p, 134-139; Adamets, 2003, p. 284-285) . When the civil war ended and the Soviet regime imposed its power over the entire country free emi gration outside the USSR stopped, It became excep tionally rare for individuals to receive authorization to leave the country (an exit visa), except for official duties abroad, A few waves of uncontrolled emigra-FIGURE 118-6 Large economic regions as a percentage of the entire Russian territory and total popula-' tion. (Source: Goskomstat, 1998, p. 50-53.) tion took place nonetheless. In 1931-1933, according to some estimates, some 200,000 Kazakhs definitely left for China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, or Turkey, to escape from a raging famine (Kozybaev et aI., 1991, p.226), World War II spurred new, and very substantial, waves of emigration, some more or less uncontrolled and others/ on the contrary, forced and severely con trolled by the authorities_ On the one hand, a vast number of refugees and displaced persons refused to return to the USSR, despite the fact that the Soviet authorities did their utmost to get them back. Various estimates have been made of their numbers. Accord ing to official sources, on January I, 1951, 452,000 Soviet citizens remained abroad (Polian, 2002, p. 573) . However, some of those who refused repatriation after 1945 had died by 1951, so that the total number of per manent departures was greater. Other estimates provide much higher figures: 1.2 to 1.5 millions, or even 2 million (Heitman, 1987, p. 10 ), a figure con sidered exaggerated, however (Pohan, 2002, p. 576) . On the other hand, the State decided to expel nearly 900,000 Germans (approximately 400,000 in accor dance with the 1939 Soviet-German Pact, and 500,000 after Russia annexed Eastern Prussia) from the USSR territory within the borders estabhshed after the war. In'addition, close to 1.5 million Poles from Western Ukraine, Western Bielorussia, Lithuania, and other regions of the USSR were moved to Poland, and nearly 400,000 Finns were moved from Karelia to Finland, and so on (Heitman, 1987; Piesowicz, 1988) .
Once the waves of migration prompted by World War II were over, the iron curtain fell again, putting a sudden end to all emigration from of the USSR.
During the 1960s, departures out of the USSR were minimal, and were more than counterbalanced by arrivals, themselves very few (Armenians returning to their historical homeland, refugees from China or stu dents from Asian or African countries); as a result, before 1970, net migration was slightly positive.
In the two following decades, the number of entries fell and, despite the rarity of departures, net migration was negative. In the 1970s, net emigration fluctuated between 10,000 and 15,000 people, only exceptionally reaching 30,000 to 40,000. During the 1980s, emigration had slowed even further.
A major change took place in 1988, as Jews, Germans and Creeks were allowed to emigrate with relative ease, and trips abroad on personal invitation were authorized. The reaction to this breath of freedom was immediate. Departures from the USSR almost trebled from 1987 to 1988 (108,000, as opposed to 39,000), and doubled again in 1989 (235,000), and once again in 1990 (452,000). As immigration remained a rare event, net emigration skyrocketed.
In May 1991, the USSR adopted a new law on the entry and exit modalities, guaranteeing that interna tional law in matters of freedom of movement would be respected; this law was supposed to be imple mented throughout the whole USSR territory from January 1st, 1993. The USSR ceased to exist at the end of 1991, but the law was nonetheless implemented in the Russian Federation and remained in force until a federal law was adopted, on. August 15, 1996, on "the modalities of entry to and exit from the Federation of Russia." This law stated: "Every citizen of the Russian Federation can freely circulate outside the borders of the Russian Federation and freely return to the Russian Federation." Thus the final restrictions on leaving the' country, in place for decades, disappeared; as a result, emigration increased substantially.
According to published government statistics, Russia's net emigration from the ex-USSR's borders rose to 1,071,000 people during the years 1990-2000 (Goskomstat, 1997 (Goskomstat, , 2001 ).
b. Immigration
Whether taking its present frontiers, those of the Russian empire or those of the USSR, Russia never experienced large-scale imrnigra tion waves in the past, despite the fact that the government occasionally accepted relatively numerous groups of migrants belonging to specific categories. Thus, for instance, German settlers were made welcome in the 18th century, and Armenians in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the whole, however, within its present borders, Russia has been a sending rather than a receiving country. This is even more the case in the European part of Russia, which for a long time was an important source of migration toward the Asian part of Russia as such or toward other republics of the USSR which became independent states after the USSR's collapse.
In the days of the Empire and under the Soviet regime, these migrations were always considered internal and, fitting neatly in its strategy to develop peripheral regions, were encouraged by the central government. However, for demographic or sociopolit ical reasons, migration gradually lost its role and Russia became host country to in-migrants as early as the second half of the 1970s (Figure 118-7) . In addition, the USSR and RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) leaders became aware of the need to open their doors to immigrants. Experts and policymakers hotly debated the question of how to supplement a scanty demographic tank of Russia with the help of migration from regions with excess manpower, such as the central Asian republics; their attempt at measures of this nature met with no great success.
As the USSR was dismantled and the Russian Fed eration became an independent state, the migration context and interpretations have radically changed. On the one hand migrations between republics, hith erto considered internal, became international migra tions overnight. On the other hand, the population's natural increase became negative since 1992 and immi gration suddenly became an important counterbalanc ing factor: even if it is not sufficient to offset the pop ulation's natural decrease, it nonetheless considerably curbs the population decline,
In the early 1990s, Russia, which, at its level, had no experience managing migration flows, created institu tions and legislation essential for this management, In 1992 the Federal Migration Service was established as an independent federal agency that subsequently was reshuffled many times, In 2002, this service lost its independence and its ftmctions were passed on to the Ministry for Matters of the Federation, Nationalities and Migration Policy. This Ministry was in turn dis mantled and migrations became the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior where, the Federal Migra tion Service was reconstituted in 2002 as a ministerial department.
Present laws concerning the treatment of refugees and displaced persons were adopted in 1993, together with a presidential decree aiming to introduce migra tion controls, However, more general federal laws on Russian Federation citizenship and on the status of for eigners, replacing regulations dating back to the Soviet regime, were only passed in 2002. Without going into detail on the content of these documents, it is nonethe less worth noting that they aroused strong criticisms within SOciety. Recognizing its weaknesses, even the President of the Russian Federation criticized the law on citizenship and, in 2003, some amendments were made,
The unfairly restrictive nature of these two laws does indeed open them up to criticism. They create too rigid a boundary between Russian Federation citizens and those of fonner constituent republics of the USSR who shared, w1til recently, the same 1927 1933 1939 1945 1951 1957 1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 FIGURE 118- A 5-year residence permit can be issued to any for' eigner reSiding in Russia and in possession of a tem porary visa; it can also be extended many times, Anyone holding such a residence permit is considered a permanent resident of Russia, whereas all other legal immigrants are defined as temporary residents (the temporary residence permit is issued either according to quotas defined yearly by the government of the Russian Federation or, in certain legally defined cases, outside quota), or as persons staying temporarily in the Federation of Russia (with visa, or without visa when they come from countries for which the visa is not required). Every foreigner who has resided in Russia for more than 5 years can apply for Russian citizenship.
Chapter 118/Population Policy in Russia   1,200 .--,.----'-----,---,.----,---.,----,---,--,----,------,----,---,------IN---- J 1989 J 1990 J 1991 J 1992 J 1993 J 1994 J 1995 J 1996 J 1997 J 1998 J 1999 J 2000 J 2001 J 2002 Trends in external migration 1Il Russia, 1989 , in thousands of persons. (Source: Vich./1evski, 2004 Therefore, the current legislation provides a legal framework that is relatively favorable for immigration and for gradual integration of immigrants into Russian society. Nonetheless, the presence of a large number of illegal immigrants, often mentioned by the authorities and the media, shows that the system provided by this legislation functions poorly, that it was created without taking into consideration actual operative policies, and that it fails to regula te spon taneous, weakly controlled migration flows about which no reliable information exists.
The official statistics only provide data on registered migrants. According to these statistics, the exchange of migrants between the ex-republics of USSR changed radically with the Union's collapse. Entries into Russia suddenly outnumbered departures, result ing in an abrupt increase in Russia's net migration. This increase was short-lived and by the end of the 1990s, net migration had greatly diminished. However, it is quite possible that the real evolution of immigration flows was different, as a result of increas ing illegal immigration This may to some extent stem from a change in the nature of migration movements. In the early years fol low'ing the USSR's demise, repatriated Russians, returning to live permanently in Russia, made up the bulk of immigrants; with time, however, immigration has increasingly included migrants in search of temporary work. Mounting difficulties in obtaining permits for work, residence, or temporary stay, were soon felt.
After the 2002 population census, Russia's Goskom stat (which became the Federal Service of State Statis tics in 2004) adjusted the data provided by current migration registration after 1995, raising immigration estimates (Figure 118-8) . TIlis correction is supposed to include illegal immigration as well, but this is ques tionable because census data on illegal immigrants are probably incomplete.
In the absence of reliable information, public opinion tends to overestimate the number of illegal immigrants, and increasingly resents it, which explains the government's ambivalent attitude and migration policy. On the one hand, the authorities are starting to appreciate immigration's new role as the main means to counterbalance natural depopula tion and shortage of manpower. On the other hand, central authorities are more preoccupied by public opinion than by the active development of migration policy. They prefer to leave the responsibil ity of organizing and implementing this policy to the lower (departmental) echelons and regional authori ties; the lattel~ however, tend to manage migratory processes according to their own interests, which are sometimes at odds with those of the country as a whole.
As a result, the President of the Russian Federation declares, "Wllat we need [...} are not prohibitions and obstacles, but an efficient migration policy that can benefit the country while being acceptable to people" (message from Russia's President to the Federal Assembly, dated May 16, 2003) . At the same time, the President acknowledges that "we [... J have not yet succeeded in developing a civilized mechanism to recruit manpower from other countries" (comment made by Russia's President on the radio, on December 18, 2003). A migration policy tailored to Russia's present needs remains to be invented.
